Additionally, the emissions strategy is highly costineffective, with the global temperature reduction achieved at a cost almost 8 times the cost of a strategy which is cost-effective in terms of "where" and "when" efficiency. These conclusions assume that trading in carbon permits is allowed among Annex I countries.
1.
Climate-Change Policy and The Kyoto Protocol
Governments have struggled to find policies that can at the same time satisfy the demands of electoral politics and meet the needs for responsible stewardship of the globe.
The initial response of nations to the threat of global warming was the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which issued from the Rio Summit of 1992. 1 Nordhaus is A. Whitney Griswold Professor of Economics, Yale University and on the staff of the Cowles Foundation at Yale. Boyer is an associate in research at Yale University. The author is grateful for extensive assistance of Megan McCarthy with this project. The research was supported by the National Science Foundation and the Department of Energy. Version is kyoto econ 020299.wpd. come from these additional actions, and we incorporate current assumptions used in the Energy Modeling Forum's runs of July 1998.
2.
Economic Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol have been widely applied in climate-change studies. 6 We begin with a description of the RICE-98 model, with a fuller account to be available shortly on the Internet.
The approach taken in the RICE model views climate change in the framework of optimal economic growth theory. This approach was developed by Frank Ramsey in the 1920s (see Ramsey [1928] ) and made rigorous by Tjalling Koopmans and others in the 1960s (see especially Koopmans [1967] ). In this framework, society invests in reproducible and human capital, along with investments to slow harmful climate change, in order to increase consumption in the future. Emissions reductions in the extended model are analogous to investment in the mainstream model. Society must take steps today, reducing consumption by devoting resources to reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, in order to prevent economically harmful climate change and thereby increasing consumption possibilities in the future. 5 The discussion here presents the results of RICE-98.09. 6 The earlier models are the DICE model (see especially Nordhaus [1992 Nordhaus [ , 1993 Nordhaus [ , 1994 ) and the RICE model (see Nordhaus and Yang [1996] ).
In the RICE model, the world is divided into thirteen regions -both large sovereign countries (such as the U.S. and India) and large regions (such as the European Union or Africa). The regional definition is provided in the appendix B. Each country is assumed to have a well-defined set of preferences by which it chooses its path for consumption over time. The preferences are increasing in per capita consumption, with diminishing marginal utility of consumption. The welfare of different generations is combined using a time-separable function that applies a pure rate of time preference to different generations. Each nation is assumed to maximize its social welfare function subject to a number of economic and geophysical constraints. The key decisions faced by each country or region are the levels in each period of consumption, investment in tangible capital, and carbon-energy use. The carbon-energy use produces CO 2 emissions which lead to future climate change.
The model contains both a traditional economic sector and a novel climate sector designed for climate-change modeling. In the economic sector, each country or region is assumed to produce a single commodity which can be used for either consumption or investment. In the baseline model, there is no trade in goods or capital, but countries sometimes trade rights for carbon emissions and receive consumption goods in return.
Each country is endowed with an initial stock of capital and labor and an initial and different level of technology. Population growth and technological change are exogenous in the baseline model, while capital accumulation is determined by optimizing the flow of consumption over time.
In the revised RICE-98 model, energy is treated by defining a new input into production called "carbon-energy." Carbon-energy is the carbon equivalent of energy consumption and is measured in carbon units. Output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas production function in capital, labor, and carbon-energy inputs. CO 2 emissions and output are therefore a joint product of using inputs of carbon-energy. Technological change takes two forms: economy-wide technological change and energy-saving technological change.
Economy-wide technological change is Hicks neutral, while energy-saving technological change is modeled as reducing the output-carbon elasticity (or the amount of carbon emissions per unit output at given input prices). There is also a non-carbon backstop technology that is available at $500 per ton of carbon-energy (approximately $700 per ton of coal or $ $120 per barrel of oil).
On the supply side, a long-run carbon supply curve is introduced. The supply curve allows for limited (albeit huge) long-run supplies of carbon-energy at rising costs.
The shape of the cost curve is drawn from estimates of the long-run cost curve for coal because the preponderance of recoverable fossil fuels are coal-based. In the optimalgrowth framework, fossil fuels are efficiently allocated over time, which implies that lowcost resources have scarcity (Hotelling) rents and that carbon-energy prices rise over time. There is a world market for carbon-energy, and the wholesale price of carbonenergy is equalized in all regions. The retail price in each region is the sum of the world wholesale price and a region-specific markup. Each country is assumed to supply its carbon-energy domestically, so there is no trade in carbon-energy.
We calibrate the production function and the markups using existing cross-country evidence on energy use, energy prices, and energy-use price elasticities.
The environmental sector of the model contains a number of geophysical relationships that link together the different factors affecting climate change. This part contains a carbon cycle, a climate-change equation, and a climate-damage relationship. In the earlier RICE model, endogenous emissions included all GHG emissions, although CO 2 was quantitatively the most important. In RICE-98, endogenous emissions are limited to industrial CO 2 . A major change in environmental policy over the last decade is that the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are now strictly controlled outside the framework of the climate-change agreements under different protocols. It is not generally appreciated that control of CFCs has had a significant impact on projected global warming. CFCs are fairly potent greenhouse gases, with 100-year GWPs (global warming potential --a measure of the climatic effect of a greenhouse gas over a given time period) thousands of times that of carbon dioxide. Industrial emissions are, as noted above, treated as a joint product of carbon-energy in the new models. Other contributions to global warming are taken as exogenous. These include CO 2 emissions from land-use changes as well as the non-CO 2 greenhouse gases.
The original DICE and RICE models used an empirical approach to estimating the carbon flows, deriving the parameters of the emissions-concentrations equation from data on emissions and concentrations. RICE-98 replaces the earlier treatment with a structural approach that uses a three-reservoir model calibrated to existing carbon-cycle models.
Climate change is represented by global mean surface temperature, and the relationship uses the consensus of climate modelers and a lag suggested by coupled oceanatmospheric models.
Understanding the economic impacts of climate change continues to be the thorniest issue in climate-change economics. The present study follows first-generation approaches by analyzing impacts on a sectoral basis. There are three major differences from many earlier studies. First, the approach here is focused on developing estimates for all major countries and regions rather than for the U.S. This focus is obviously necessary both because global warming is a global problem and because the impacts are likely to be larger in poorer countries. Second, this study focuses more heavily on the non-market aspects of climate change with particular importance given to the potential for catastrophic risk; this approach is taken because of the finding of the first-generation studies that the "best-guess" impacts on market sectors are likely to be relatively limited.
Third, we estimate that impacts are likely to differ sharply by region -Russia and other high-latitude countries (principally Canada) are likely to benefit slightly from a 3 degree C benchmark warming . At the other extreme, low-income regions -particularly Africa and India -and Europe appear to be quite vulnerable to climate change. The United States appears to be relatively less vulnerable to climate change than many countries.
A final important revision in the RICE-98 model is different treatment of the discount rate. Two important changes have been made. First, the new model allows for different discount rates in different regions. The pure rate of social time preference appears to be higher in low-income countries than in high-income countries. Based on the observed relationship between measured capital stock and GDP, we take the initial pure rate of time preference to be 3 percent per year in high-income countries and up to 6 percent per year in low-income countries. The second difference builds in a decline in the pure rate of social time preference in the coming decades. This can either be interpreted as reflecting a likely decline in the discount rate or as reflecting uncertainty in underlying factors which would lead to a decline in the certainty-equivalent discount rate even if the underlying discount rate were unchanged. (For more explanation, see Nordhaus 1998b.) In the modeling results presented here, the pure rate of social time preference rate in highincome countries declines to 2.3 percent per year by 2100 and about 1.4 percent per year by 2300. The major effect of the changing treatment of the discount rate is to lower current optimal carbon taxes and control rates and to raise long-run optimal carbon taxes and control rates.
The equations of the RICE-98 model are provided in Appendix A. A more thorough discussion of the model can be found in Nordhaus 1998b. (The version of the model described in that source has been updated since the writing of this paper.)
Assumptions for the analysis of the Kyoto Protocol
In the current analysis, we analyze a number of different runs to determine the effect of different climate-change policies on the global and regional economies as well as on the major environmental variables related to climate change. Table 1 shows the major runs analyzed in the present paper. Most of them require no discussion, but a few details need elaboration.
The reference case (Run 1) assumes that the energy and economic systems evolve with no carbon-emissions constraints or carbon taxes. In the "optimal" case (run 2), carbon abatement is optimized over space and time -the optimization balances the costs of substituting other inputs for carbon energy with the benefits of reduced climate change. It will be useful to provide a word of interpretation of the optimal case. This is not presented in the belief that an environmental pope will suddenly appear to provide the infallible canons of policy that should and will be scrupulously followed by all. Rather, the optimal policy is provided as a benchmark for policies to determine how efficient or inefficient alternative approaches may be.
The cases denoted "Kyoto emissions limitations" take the emissions limitations agreed upon in the Kyoto Protocol and extend them indefinitely for Annex I countriesthis might be called "Kyoto forever." There are four variants of the Kyoto Protocol analyzed here. Under the "no-trade" run 3a, no trading of emissions permits is allowed among the six major blocs of Annex I countries and there are no offsets with the nonAnnex I countries. Under the "OECD-trade" runs (run 3b), emissions trading is allowed only among the OECD regions. 7 The "Annex I-trade" case (run 3c) allows full trading allowed among all Annex I regions. The global trading case (3d) extends the umbrella of trading to all countries. In this case, the non-Annex I regions receive emissions permits equal to their no-control emissions in run 1, but regions are then allowed to sell any emissions rights that exceed their actual emissions. Each of these runs has serious implementation issues, but these are ignored in this analysis.
It should be emphasized that global trading in case 3d is actually a radical extension of the Kyoto Protocol and contains crucial and questionable assumptions about the behavior of non-Annex I countries. In principle, each region will be better off by agreeing to this limit-and-trade procedure -it can do no worse than simply consuming its permits and can do better by reducing its low marginal-cost sources and selling the permits at the world price. This assumption is highly questionable in practice, however, because of the difficulty of estimating and assigning the appropriate baseline emissions, because of the need to ensure compliance among countries with weak governance structures, and because of the potential for countries repudiating their commitments in the future. This point can be put in a different way. It is desirable to design policies that are economically efficient so that the environmental objectives can be attained in a least cost manner. There are four kinds of standards that we can examine -how-efficiency, whereefficiency, when-efficiency, and why-efficiency. How-efficiency denotes the use of efficient ways of achieving the actual emissions in a given year and country; in the current study, we assume that countries attain how-efficiency by either using uniform carbon taxes or by auctioning off emissions permits. Where-efficiency denotes allocating emissions reductions across countries to minimize the costs of attaining the global emissions target for a given year. As we move from the no-trade to the global-trade case,
we are assured to attain where-efficiency. When-efficiency refers to efficient allocation of emissions over time. There is no reason to believe the Kyoto Protocol satisfies the criterion of when-efficiency because the emissions targets were arbitrarily chosen. Cases 4a and 4b examine the efficient pattern of emissions reductions to achieve when efficiency when the targets are the concentrations and global temperature associated with the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, why-efficiency refers to the question of the ultimate goal of the environmental program and denotes a plan which balances costs of abatement and benefits of damage reduction. Again, the Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to satisfy the criterion of why-efficiency because the emissions targets were arbitrarily chosen; moreover, one of the major findings of the present study is that the Kyoto Protocol is extremely far from a why-efficiency policy. The optimal program in run 2 satisfies whyefficiency (given the parameters of the RICE model) and can therefore be used as a benchmark for why-efficiency comparisons with other proposals.
1. Reference: no controls 2. Optimal: sets emissions by region and period to balance the costs and benefits of emissions reductions Major Results
In this section we present the major results of the current set of runs. It should be emphasized that these projections from the RICE-98 model are subject to major uncertainties and are constantly being revised as new data and models are developed. The sections review in order the results for the climate variables, the economic variables, the costs and damages, the comparisons among the different runs, and finally compares these results with other studies.
Environmental variables
The first set of results pertains to the major environmental variables -emissions, concentrations, and global temperature increases. The buildup of CO 2 concentrations projected in the RICE-98 model is shown in Figure 3 . The buildup is slightly less rapid than in standard scenarios. In the uncontrolled run of RICE-98, CO 2 concentrations in 2100 are about 642 ppm (1357 GtC) as compared to 710 ppm (1500 GtC) in the IPCC IS92a scenario. 9 The lower buildup of concentrations is due to both lower emissions and a slightly lower fraction of CO 2 concentrations retained in the atmosphere than in standard calculations.
The impact on globally averaged temperature is shown in Figure 4 and Table 3 .
The trend in the reference RICE-98 run is close to the conventional IPCC scenarios. The baseline temperature increase is 0.43 ºC in 1995 and rises to 2.3 ºC by 2100, for an increase of 1.9 degrees. This increase compares with a baseline warming used in IPCC Figure 5 shows the difference in temperature from the reference for different scenarios. These impacts mirror the numbers on cumulative emissions with a lag. Note that the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on global temperature is quite modest, especially for the first century. The reduction in global mean temperature in the Annex I case relative to the reference in 2100 is 0.13 ºC; this compares with a difference of 0.17 ºC from the Kyoto Protocol calculated by Wigley [1998] . The temperature reduction in the optimal run is essentially the same as the Kyoto runs by the 22 nd century.
The key results here are the following:
•Emissions trends in this analysis are close to the standard estimates considered in climate-change policies.
•The Kyoto Protocol will have a modest impact on global warming.
Because the Kyoto Protocol policy does not succeed in capping the Figure 5 emissions of non-Annex I countries, the long-run impact of the Kyoto Protocol on carbon emissions and global temperature is extremely small.
•In the short run, the emissions, concentrations, and warming under the Kyoto Protocol are more stringent than the optimal policy; by the 22 nd century the optimal and Kyoto policies have essentially the same environmental impacts. Economic variables
Difference in global temperature

Carbon prices
One of the most useful measures of the stringency of climate-change policy is the level of carbon prices that would be generated by the policies. "Carbon prices" are the prices of rights to emit CO 2 . In a tradable-emissions regime, they would be the prices of emissions permits; in a fiscal regime, they would be carbon taxes or emissions fees. Table   4 
Overall Abatement Costs
The next set of issues concerns the economic impact of alternative policies. The present value of total abatement costs is shown in Table Note: Cost is equal to the discounted value of consumption for 30 decades, discounted at the consumption discount rate. Transfers are calculated as the present value of the purchases (sales being negative) valued at the U.S. discount rate. Runs exclude climate damage. Note: Cost is equal to the discounted value of consumption for 30 decades, discounted at the consumption discount rate. Transfers are calculated as the present value of the purchases (sales being negative) valued at the U.S. discount rate. Runs include climate damage.
market exchange rates. The major and not surprising result is that the economic burden of the Kyoto Protocol lies completely on Annex I countries. The countries whose outputs are most seriously affected are Russia and Eastern Europe. Their outputs are reduced because of the need to reduce energy use to sell permits; their levels of income as opposed to output are actually higher.
Costs by Region
It is important to understand the distribution of costs by region. The following table shows the impact on discounted consumption (including trading transfers):
This table gives some idea of why the U.S. might be unhappy about the Kyoto Protocol: it bears two-thirds of the burden.
4.
Trading and transfers Figure 12 shows the impact of the Kyoto Protocol -assuming Annex I tradingon incomes of different countries. In these figures, "gross domestic income" equals gross domestic product including the net revenues from sale of emissions permits. Both the United States and Europe are losers, although the time paths are different. Russia is a winner. Figure 13 and Table 7 The results on flows of permit revenues reveal two major flaws in the design of the Kyoto Protocol. First, the Protocol caps the emissions of one group of countries at historical levels but does not do so for the non-Annex I countries. Bringing non-Annex I countries in under the additionality criterion assigns reference emissions to non-Annex I countries, thus giving them substantially different treatment from Annex I countries. A second and related major design flaw is assigning historical emissions. This gives a major windfall to those countries which had inefficient energy systems (particularly Russia, Eastern Europe, and Germany after its purchase of East Germany). A better procedure would be a rolling emissions base, which would remove the advantages of inefficiency and also remove the difference of treatment of non-Annex I and Annex I countries.
Summary of economic impacts
The overall impacts of the Kyoto Protocol and variants are complex, but the major points to emphasize are the following:
•There are big impacts of virtually all variants of the Kyoto Protocol on Annex I countries. The discounted value of production costs (exclusive of transfers and climate damages) for Annex I countries range from a low of $50 billion in the global-trading case to a high of $1,507 billion in the notrading case.
•However, these number are impacts on output. Even though the global cost in the global trading case is significantly reduced by emissions trading, the impacts on national income continue to be extremely large in all cases. If transfers are included, the overall cost to Annex I nations of the Kyoto Protocol ranges from $344 to $1,507 billion.
•Non-Annex I countries, Russia, and Eastern Europe are the major beneficiaries of the Kyoto Protocol, even if damages are excluded. The benefits for non-Annex I countries are around $20 billion in lower production costs, exclusive of lower damages.
•Trading significantly reduces the aggregate cost of abatementparticularly trading with Russia and low-income countries like China. But the cost of these efficiency gains are large transfers -particularly from the United States.
Costs and damages
The comparisons up to now exclude the damages from global warming. It is always important to keep in mind that the point of reducing emissions is to reduce future damages. The impact of different policies on both costs and damages is shown in Figure   14 . The first set of bars shows the discounted value of damages. Our estimates indicate that there are likely to be substantial costs of global warming in any of the cases examined here; the costs total approximately $1.8 trillion in present value in the reference case.
10 10 The damage function in the version of the RICE-98 model used for this analysis is undergoing revision and will change in the final version.
As shown in Figure 15 , the different policies reduce damages by only a modest amount. Indeed, one of the surprises is how little the policies affect the damages from global warming. The reasons are that, because there is so much inertia in the climate system and because the Protocol does not limit the emissions of developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol reduces the global temperature increase by only a fraction of a degree over the next century. The other point that is shown in Figure 14 is that inefficient policies, such as OECD trading or no trading, raise the costs of abatement substantially with little or no improvement in benefits. For example, moving from no controls to the Kyoto Protocol plan with Annex I trading incurs discounted abatement cost of $0.83 trillion; however, the discounted value of damages decreases only from $1.83 to 1.72 trillion. The benefit cost ratio of moving to the optimal plan is 1.2. By contrast, the benefit-cost ratios are 0.14 for Annex I trading and 0.07 for no trading. All these ratios make the optimistic assumption that the policies are efficiently implemented in each region. Figure 15 shows the distribution of net impacts (including transfers and climate damages) of the three major policies considered here.
The main conclusions that come from an examination of damages are that there are likely to be substantial damages from climate change, but that the Kyoto Protocol captures essentially the same damage reduction as the optimal program at a substantial increase in costs.
The Gains from Trade
Much has been made about the gains from trade. Table 8 The present paper examines the implications of the Kyoto Protocol and variants of that policy in a new integrated-assessment model of climate change and the world economy. Before moving to the major conclusions, it must be emphasized that these results should be taken with suitable reservations reflecting the difficulties inherent in the subject and the fact that this is but one of many models that can be used to estimate the impacts of the Kyoto Protocol.
First, it appears that the strategy behind the Kyoto Protocol has no grounding in economics or environmental policy. The approach of freezing emissions at a given level for a group of countries is not related to a particular goal for concentrations, temperature, or damages. Nor does it bear any relation to an economically oriented strategy that would balance the costs and benefits of greenhouse-gas reductions. The best way of comparing runs is probably the stringency of policy as indicated by the carbon prices. The emissions and concentrations implicit in the Kyoto Protocol are close to those in the optimal policy over the next century. However, because the emissions reductions are targeted to Annex I countries, the costs of achieving these emission reductions are 8 to 14 times more costly (these being the full Annex I-trading and the no-trading variants). Note: Equations with asterisks (*) are for equations that are substantially revised since the original DICE and RICE models.
5.
Variable definitions in RICE-98
A J (t)= total factor productivity of region J B J (t) = backstop energy supplied in region J c J (t) = per capita consumption of region J CumC(t) = cumulative world extraction of carbon energy CumC* = total recoverable world resources of carbon-energy D J (t) = damage from climate change of region J EC J (t) = carbon-energy consumption = CO 2 emissions of region J EC(t) = EC J (t) = total consumption of carbon-energy = CO 2 emissions F(t) = total radiative forcings I J (t) = gross investment of region J K J (t) = capital stock of region J L J (t) = population, proportional to employment of region J markup E J (t) = markup of carbon energy of region J (exclusive of carbon prices) M AT (t) = mass of carbon in atmosphere M LO (t) = mass of carbon in lower reservoir (lower ocean) M UP (t) = mass of carbon in upper reservoir (atmosphere, biosphere, upper ocean) omega J (t) = damage factor of region J O(t) = other radiative forcings p B (t) = price of backstop substitute for carbon-energy p E J (t) = price of carbon-energy of region J pi J (t) = allocation of carbon emissions permits of region J phi J = welfare weights of region J q(t) = world wholesale price of carbon-energy (including Hotelling rent) Q J (t) = gross output of region J rho J (t) = pure rate of social time preference for country J and time period t t = periods [t=1 for 1990-99, t=2 for 2000-09, and so forth] tau J (t) = carbon tax T LO (t) = global mean temperature of lower oceans T UP (t) = global mean surface temperature U J = utility function per period of region J W J = social welfare function of region J
